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In a rare effort to internalize congestion costs, London recently instituted charges for traveling by car to 
the central city during peak hours. Although the theoretical influence on the number and severity of 
traffic accidents is ambiguous, we show that the policy generated a substantial reduction in both the 
number of accidents and in the accident rate. At the same time, the spatial, temporal and vehicle specific 
nature of the charge may cause unintended substitutions as traffic and accidents shift to other proximate 
areas, times and to uncharged vehicles. We demonstrate that, to the contrary, the congestion charge 
reduced accidents and the accident rate in adjacent areas, times and for uncharged vehicles. These 
results are consistent with the government's objective to use the congestion charge to more broadly 
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This study analysed existing Road Accident Data and traffic counts data that are publicly 
available from the UK Data Archive and the Department for Transport, respectively. Further 
documentation about the data that were used in this paper is available from the Lancaster 









Early in 2003 London imposed a daily charge for driving on public roads within its central 
district. Economists hailed the charge as "a triumph of economics," a recognition by policy 
makers that congestion is a costly externality and that road pricing is an appropriate response 
(Leape 2006). While the charge remains flat and so does not vary with distance or time of day, it 
has been credited with substantial reductions in congestion and increases in travel speed.  Less 
examined is the influence on traffic accidents.  While reduced traffic accidents were touted as an 
additional social benefit, the policy created a series of offsetting behavioral incentives that leave 
the overall influence on traffic accidents in doubt. Examining this influence requires suitable 
counterfactuals as the number of London traffic accidents had been trending down prior to the 
congestion charge.  
 This paper examines monthly traffic accident counts in central London before and after 
the congestion charge compared to several sensible controls. We confirm a substantial and robust 
decline in accidents associated with the advent of the congestion charge. This represents an 
important public health and social policy finding as resources and lives were saved by diverting 
travel to safer transport modes and by reducing the aggregate amount of travel. Equally 
important, we demonstrate that accident rates, the number of accidents per million miles driven, 
also decline with the advent of the congestion charge. Reduced traffic congestion ameliorated an 
accident externality (Edlin and Karaca-Mandic 2006) as the congestion charge went beyond 
simply reducing miles driven and so accidents. It reduced the probability of drivers being in an 
accident for a given trip to central London. 
As the charge is limited to a specific zone, for specific vehicles and for specific hours of 
the week, we test for substitution effects. These measure the extent to which the charge may 
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increase accidents in areas outside the zone, the vehicle type or the hours to which it applies. 
Such increases might be anticipated if travelers continue to travel to Central London but 
substitute uncharged trips for charged trips. Thus, we examine whether or not traffic accidents 
increase on weekends and evenings (times not subject to the charge). We examine whether or not 
accidents increase for motorbikes, bicycles or taxis which are all exempt. Finally, we investigate 
whether accidents increase in areas immediately adjacent to the charge zone as previous through 
drivers skirt the charge zone or as drivers travel up to the zone and then cross onto public 
transport.  We find no evidence of long-term accident increases in any of these three dimensions.  
Indeed, traffic accidents and accident rates decline in adjacent areas, out of charged times and for 
uncharged vehicles relative to controls. This contradicts earlier evaluations that fail to use 
suitable controls and examine only a shorter window for policy influences.   
We also confirm that the decline in total accidents and accident rates in the charged zone 
is matched by declines associated with serious accidents and with fatalities. These declines also 
persist in proximate regions and uncharged times. In sum, the evidence suggests that the 
congestion charge helps in accomplishing the government objective of fundamentally changing 
behavior regarding the frequency and mode of transit into Central London with beneficial and 
general reductions in the number of traffic accidents and in accident rates, a point not previously 
made.  
 
2.  Background 
Central London has long held a reputation as among the most congested of major Western cities.  
Over the second half of the twentieth century, traffic speeds decreased and vehicle counts 
increased. Just prior to imposing the charge, all-day average network travel speeds averaged a 
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sluggish 8.6 mph and more than 1/3 of all travel time was spent simply not moving (Transport 
for London 2003).  When compared to an uncongested speed of around 20 miles per hour, this 
represented 3.7 minutes per mile of lost time. Multiplied by the huge number of trips and the 
value of time, the waste was obviously enormous.  Fully ninety percent of all London residents 
(not just those of Central London) agreed in polls that "there is too much traffic in London" and 
identified congestion as the "most important problem requiring action" (see survey description 
and references in Leape 2006, p. 157).   
 At least since Pigou (1924), economists have advocated governmental taxes and charges 
to bring the actual prices that consumers face into alignment with full social costs. The 
application of this notion to congested roads dates back to at least Walters (1961) and Vickrey 
(1963) who emphasize that consumers should pay directly for the costs they impose on other 
travelers as an incentive to use road resources efficiently. If road space is unpriced, traffic 
volumes will increase until congestion limits further growth with a resulting waste in travel time 
and reduction in travel reliability.  Additional costs associated with congestion include increased 
air pollution and increased energy dependence (see Parry et al. 2007).  
Despite the advantages of taxing congestion, there exists a long history of public and 
political opposition that has meant there have been relatively few examples (Harsman and 
Quigley 2010).  In 2007 Stockholm introduced a tax deductible charge to enter the central city 
with the proceeds used for road construction. In 2013, following a series of temporary charges 
and lawsuits, Milan introduced a permanent congestion charge with much of the emphasis being 
on reducing pollution. A charge to enter lower Manhattan in New York City generated a decade 
of active debate but no action. Voters soundly defeated proposed congestion charges in 
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Manchester and Edinburgh. The political resistance often coalesces around opposition to a fee 
seen as largely unrelated to infrastructure cost recovery.
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In addition to political resistance, network issues make proper pricing inherently difficult. 
While pricing a single road between two destinations may be easy, properly pricing a 
complicated road network like Central London was thought unworkable.  Each intersection, road 
and specific set of combinations contributes to congestion.  Moreover, each of these contributes 
in differing degrees at different times of the day, week or year.  Thus, while optimal charges vary 
by road, intersection and time of day, the creation and enforcement of such charges is likely 
intractable or infeasible (Newberry 1990; Shepherd and Sumalee 2004).  Moreover, the proper 
pricing may interact in complicated ways with the extent and pricing of parking (Fosgerau and 
de Palma 2013) and the endogenous choice of speed by drivers (Verhoef and Rouwendal 2004). 
Thus, the London congestion charge emerged as a rather blunt instrument. It followed the basic 
approach "to make private transport relatively less attractive and public transport more 
attractive.” (Newberry 1990 p. 35) It combined a flat charge for private and commercial vehicles 
entering the congestion zone, with the revenues from the charge earmarked for reinvestment in 
London's public transport. 
 London imposed an initial daily charge in February 2003 of £5 for driving on roads 
within the congestion zone between 7:00 am and 6:30 pm on weekdays.
2
  The congestion zone is 
pictured in Figure 1.  The original fee has since been increased to £8 in July of 2005, to £10 in 
2011 and to £11.50 in 2014.  Passes are typically purchased on-line and enforcement relies on a 
series of video cameras at every entry point to the zone and on mobile units within the zone.  A 
                                                 
1
 Adding to confusion, polices are often misleadingly named. Vancouver voted in April 2015 on a "congestion tax" 
that was merely a general sales tax dedicated to public transit (Sinoski 2015).  
2
 Beginning in February 2007, the end of the charge time was moved from 6:30 pm to 6:00 pm, a move we account 
for explicitly in identifying accidents in the treatment. 
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license plate recognition system matches against daily purchases and violators are sent penalty 
notices for escalating fines that average 20 to 30 times the daily charge. The day pass allows 
travel in and around the congestion zone of Central London.  This eight square mile zone 
includes tourist sites, the City (London’s financial district), Parliament, major government 
offices and prime business locations.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
 The charge applies to private and commercial vehicles entering the congestion zone 
during the charging hours.  Importantly, motorcycles, bicycles, buses and taxis are exempt.  Also 
exempt, are vehicles belonging to those who live within the zone but keep their vehicles off the 
street during the charging hours.  When these residents do travel during the charging hours, they 
pay a highly discounted charge of only 10 percent of the full charge.   
 The revenue raised from the charging program has been substantial but so have the 
administrative costs (Leape 2006). The net revenue from charges was £97 million in 2004-5 and 
was supplemented by £70 million in penalties that same year. Such revenues have been largely 
spent on mass transit improvements with smaller expenditures on road safety and biking/walking 
initiatives.  The earmarking of revenues for such alternative transport is anticipated to continue 
until at least 2023. 
 Early indications showed meaningful reductions in distances traveled within the zone. 
These comparisons of the year immediately before and after the charge showed, for example, 
that the total distance driven by cars was reduced by an enormous 34 percent (Leape 2006).  At 
the same time, the distances driven by bikes, motorcycles, taxis and buses all increased resulting 
in a more modest overall decline in vehicle distances of 12 percent.  Nonetheless, this was 
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sufficient to reduce the time lost to congestion by nearly 30 percent (Transport for London 
2005).  Thus, the early indication was clear that the charge reduced congestion during the times it 
was applied, in the zone to which it applied, and for the vehicles to which it applied.  This 
generates substantial social benefits as the values placed by individuals on reduced travel time 
and improved reliability are typically large (Small, Winston, and Yan, 2005). 
 In addition to reducing congestion and so saving time, a critical by-product of the charge 
was thought to be reduced traffic accidents. While clearly identified as "an additional social 
benefit" by Transport for London (2005), the logic implying an overall reduction in accidents 
and its interpretation seems in doubt. First, Shefer and Rietveld (1997) argue that there should be 
an inverse relationship between traffic congestion and accidents. The increase in speeds allowed 
by reduced congestion may increase the number and severity of accidents. Certainly, this 
balancing of time savings and the increased chance of traffic fatalities is at the heart of setting 
speed limits (Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004). While the evidence seems to depend on the 
exact circumstances and perhaps even the type of roads being examined (Wang et al. 2009), the 
possibility exists that the congestion charge increased vehicle speed and at the same time 
increased the number of bikes and pedestrians with an uncertain net influence on the number and 
severity of accidents.   
Second, even if the congestion charge reduced the number of accidents by reducing the 
trips by those charged, there are important avenues of substitution. In the empirical estimation 
we focus on three forms of substitution. Most fundamentally, those who would otherwise be 
charged may substitute the nearest uncharged route. As Parry and Bento (2002) emphasize, 
charging on one route or in one area may simply add to congestion elsewhere and in a complex 
network it may not be possible to monitor and charge all of these spillovers. Thus, cross traffic 
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that might have gone directly through Central London can be expected to avoid the charge zone 
but increase congestion in adjacent areas.  Commuters might be anticipated to drive up to the 
charge zone and search for parking before crossing into the zone without their vehicle.  Parry and 
Bento (2002) argue that the increased congestion in alternative areas will increase traffic 
accidents in these uncharged adjacent areas. Second, those who would otherwise be charged may 
substitute to uncharged vehicles.  As mentioned, buses, bikes, motorbikes and taxis are exempt.
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Third, those who would otherwise be charged may substitute out of the weekday charge time by 
rearranging trips to the evenings or weekends. While not every trip might be easily shifted, it 
seems sensible for a variety of shopping, entertainment and social trips.  Thus, in addition to 
examining the pattern of accidents in the charge zone during the charge time and for the charged 
vehicles, we will test for the extent of substitution on these three important margins.  
Third, even if the congestion charge successfully reduced the number of accidents, the 
economic lesson remains in doubt. The reduction in accident costs and lost lives might be 
deemed socially beneficial from a public health perspective but it need not have ameliorated an 
accident externality associated with congestion. An accident externality exists when a driver 
recognizes his own risk when taking to the road but does not consider the risk he imposes on 
other drivers. Borrowing from Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006 p. 932), when congestion 
generates this externality, a one percent reduction in driving should decrease accidents by more 
than one percent. Thus, we join those studying the traffic externality by examining accident 
rates, accidents per million miles driven, to determine the influence of the congestion charge.
4
 If 
                                                 
3
 Indeed, motorbike dealers ran advertising campaigns encouraging commuters to purchase their product with the 
slogan "make Mayor Livingston see red," as motorbikes would not be charged and so not contribute to the 
profitability of the congestion charge.   
4
 Those testing for the presence and size of this externality include Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006), Saito et al. 
(2010) and Huang et al. (2013). 
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the charge simply reduces traffic miles and accidents proportionally, this rate should not change 
and there would be little evidence in favor of ameliorating an externality. 
Others have been concerned with the influence of the congestion charge on traffic 
accidents.  Early comparisons simply examined numbers of accidents in the charging zone before 
and after the charge (Leape 2006; Quddus 2008).  As suggested, this may be problematic both 
because of substitution out of the zone and also because the trend was of decreasing accidents 
within the zone prior to introducing the charge. Li et al. (2012) examine a particularly short time 
frame and show a decrease in car casualties within the zone relative to those happening in the 
English city of Leeds. For motorcycle casualties they find an increase in London compared to 
Birmingham and, similarly, for bicycle casualties they find an increase in London compared to 
Manchester. None of these authors consider accident rates. 
We provide a comprehensive examination of the influence of the congestion charge that 
examines all accidents as well as serious and fatal accidents. We explore how robust the results 
are to choice of the control, empirical specification and to varying the time frame.  We examine 
the influence of the congestion charge on charged vehicle accidents within the charge zone and 
hours. We then investigate the influence of the congestion charge on adjacent regions, times and 
on uncharged vehicles. To the extent the data allow we also examine this rich set of issues not 
with accident counts but with the accident rate.  In this fashion we shed light both on the public 
health issue of whether life and limb were saved and also on the economic issue of whether an 






3. Data and Methodology 
We use road accident data from the Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR) that contain all motor vehicle accidents reported to the police from 2000 to 
2009 for all 416 local jurisdictions in Britain.
5
 We know the type of accident (whether it caused 
either serious injury or death), the date and time of the accident, location of the accident and the 
age of the driver of any vehicle involved in the accident. This, when combined with GIS 
mapping of the congestion zone, allows us to accurately assign accidents to the congestion 
charge zone in the pre and post policy periods. In addition this allows us to assign accidents to 
areas that are adjacent to but outside the congestion charge zone (CCZ).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Figure 2 provides initial evidence of the congestion charge effect on traffic accidents in 
the CCZ. We use as an initial comparison the average monthly accidents per city for the 20 most 
populous cities in Great Britain (excluding London). The figure shows the accidents in charged 
times for charged vehicles for both the CCZ and the control group.  It demonstrates a declining 
trend in accidents over the period and shows evidence of seasonality, well known features of 
traffic accidents in Great Britain which will be controlled for in our estimations. Otherwise the 
comparison series appears reasonably stable before and after the congestion charge. In contrast, 
the monthly accidents in the congestion charge zone drop markedly after the congestion charge. 
Initially accidents in the CCZ are approximately 40 higher per month than the comparison group. 
This difference essentially disappears after the introduction of the charge. 
  
INSERT FIGURE 3 
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Figure 3 brings these points into sharper relief. It provides linear spline estimates of 
traffic accidents before and after the introduction of the congestion charge for the CCZ and the 
comparison group. There is a large reduction in accidents in the CCZ that is coincident with the 
introduction of charging with reasonably similar trends either side of the change. For the control 
group there is no evidence of a level change at the discontinuity nor is there a clear change in the 
trend.  
The initial specification estimates the number of accidents per jurisdiction and month in a 
difference in difference formulation: 
 
     )*( ittittitiit TXPolicyCCZPolicyCCZAcc                              (1) 
      
In this specification Acc is the number of accidents in the month and area (there are 21 areas, the 
twenty largest cities and the CCZ), CCZ indicates that the accident was within the congestion 
charge zone, Policy indicates that the accident happens after the date of the congestion charge 
policy, T is a linear time trend, X a vector of controls. The key parameter of interest is β which 
provides the difference in difference estimate of the effect of the congestion charge on accidents. 
 Subsequent estimates modify eq. (1) by adopting an alternative dependent variable, the 
accident rate. The rate measures the accident count in the relevant jurisdiction and time period 
divided by the miles driven (in millions) in the jurisdiction and time period. The miles driven (or 
traffic flows) come from critical nodes or segments of roadways monitored by the Department of 
Transport with the number of vehicles passing through each segment and the length of each 
segment used to generate the reported miles per jurisdiction.
6
 We follow this same methodology 
to develop a measure specifically for the London congestion zone. The data on flows identifies 
                                                 
6
 The miles driven in Birmingham, for instance, are built up from 161 monitored segments. 
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the type of vehicle (automobiles, bikes, etc.) but is available only on an annual basis. Rather than 
divide the number of accidents in each month of the year by a constant annual estimate, we 
simply aggregate the rates measure within each jurisdiction: the annual number of accidents 
divided by the annual miles driven.  While this dramatically reduces the sample size, it more 
accurately reflects the underlying variation in the data. 
 Several empirical challenges exist when identifying the effect of the congestion charge on 
accidents and accident rates. It is well known that during our period of analysis, traffic accidents 
and fatalities have generally been declining in England and in central London in particular 
(Department of Transport, 2013).  We will explore the underlying parallel trends assumption in a 
flexible version of (1) where time trends are allowed to vary between the treatment and control. 
We include controls for jurisdiction area and annual measures for jurisdiction population (Green 
et al. 2014). We begin by contrasting the congestion charge area, time and vehicles to the 
controls of the 20 largest cities in Britain for the charge time and vehicles. We cluster standard 
errors at the jurisdiction level but ultimately experiment with this as well suggesting that the 
pattern we identify is robust.  
We then move beyond this to allow the data to determine a synthetic control that 
optimally weights the various 20 cities to match the underlying characteristics of the treated CCZ 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003 and Abadie et al. 2010). The matching process minimises the 
mean squared prediction error (the average number of accidents per jurisdiction in the CCZ 
minus that in the synthetic control) for the pre-policy periods. The resulting control exhibits the 
most similar traffic accident pattern to that observed in the CCZ before the passage of the 
congestion charge and is then compared to the CCZ in a straightforward difference in difference.   
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The likelihood that the congestion charge will have influenced traffic patterns in 
neighboring areas leads us to remove all other areas of London from our control group from the 
start. In subsequent analysis we explicitly seek to examine these geographic spillovers among 
other types of spillovers. We will also separately focus on serious and fatal accidents and 
explicitly consider other related policy changes during our data window. 
 
4. Empirical Results on Accident Counts 
 The first column of Table 1 provides a difference in difference estimate of the policy 
effect following the specification in (1). This specification includes both a trend variable 
revealing the downward trend in accidents and its interaction. It also includes monthly dummies 
to capture the evident cyclicality seen in the raw data.  In a pattern, often noted in the British 
data, the fourth quarter is found to have the highest number of accidents (the last three months of 
each calendar year).
7
 Area and population controls behave as anticipated from earlier studies 
with jurisdictions with greater area having fewer accidents and those with greater population 
having more accidents. The critical policy estimate reveals that the congestion charge is 
associated with approximately 40 fewer accidents per month in the CCZ when compared to the 
other 20 cities. As the pre-policy monthly average in the CCZ was 111 this represents roughly a 
35 percent decline. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
The underlying accidents within a given area can be viewed as generating a count 
variable. This may have implications for both our point estimates and their precision. The next 
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 This pattern is also obvious in an otherwise identical specification that replaces the monthly dummies with 
quarterly dummies. The estimated policy influence is not materially changed in such a specification. 
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two columns of Table 1 examine this by estimating both Poisson and negative binomial models 
of accidents. We note that there is no concern with zero inflation as none of the jurisdictions 
have a single period with zero accidents. The results mirror those already presented as they show 
statistically significant and large reductions in the number of accidents associated with the 
introduction of charging. These reductions of 32-36% correspond closely with the magnitude 
from the OLS estimates. The null of no over-dispersion of the dependent variable is rejected at 
the 1 per cent level. Thus, the model is more correctly estimated via negative binomial than 
Poisson. In an effort to determine whether we should continue to use the negative binomial, we 
calculated the mean squared residuals for both the negative binomial and the original linear 
specification in column (1). They were very similar but that for the linear specification did 
slightly better (1154.4 vs. 1155.9). Critically, we found no specification in which the linear 
estimate returned a significant policy reduction but the negative binomial did not. Thus, in 
estimates in subsequent tables we focus on OLS estimation but will also typically provide the 
percentage measure from the negative binomial for ease of comparison.
8
  
A careful examination of Figure 2 suggests that the cyclical pattern evident in the CCZ 
may differ materially from that in the control.  It appears the peak of the cycle for the CCZ is 
earlier in the year raising concern that this out of phase cyclicality may play a role in our 
estimates.  To examine this concern we interact every monthly dummy with the CCZ to allow for 
separate cycles between treatment and control.  While cyclical differences were confirmed with 
five of interactions proving significant, the differences proved of no consequence to the policy 
estimate.  This estimate is shown in the fourth column of Table 1 and continues to indicate a 
highly significant decline of approximately 40 accidents per month. 
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 We also estimated both a simple logistic estimate and a linear estimate that controlled for jurisdiction fixed effects 
with no meaningful change in either significance or magnitude. 
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One feature of the data illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 is the large differences in average 
accident levels between the CCZ and the average of other cities in Great Britain. This reflects the 
unique position of central London in terms of activity and traffic density. This might cause 
concern regarding the suitability of our control group. To address this we adopt the synthetic 
panel approach as set out by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). This involves optimally weighting 
the comparison group to match the pre-treatment accident data for the CCZ. As a result of this 
weighting, the mean squared prediction error between the CCZ and the control was reduced from 
over 1000 using the 20 largest cities to only 20.4 with the optimal weighting of those cities.  All 
cities took a positive weight in the optimal match although many received only a couple of 
percentage points.  The largest weights were given to Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and 
Liverpool. These four major cities took the large majority of the weight.
9
  
INSERT FIGURE 4 
The result of the matching is demonstrated in Figure 4. This shows a very close match 
between the pre-accident levels and trends for the CCZ and the synthetic control group, followed 
by a marked reduction in accidents post charge introduction. The corresponding point estimates 
from the difference-in-difference are reported in the final column of Table 1. These suggest that 
congestion charging reduced the number of accidents by more than 28 per month. Thus, there are 
differences between a not weighted and optimally weighted control but the basic result of a large 
decline remains apparent. Critically, the fact that the optimal weighting scheme includes all cities 
indicates that it is superior to simply using a single alternative jurisdiction as the control (as done 
in Li et al. 2012). 
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 It is important to note that the match is between only a part of London, the congestion zone, and an already 
selected set of the nation's largest cities.  Those cities enter in their entirety.  
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As a further examination, we conducted the series of placebo tests suggested in Abadie et 
al (2010) by iteratively applying the synthetic control method used above to estimate the effect 
of the congestion charge in every other city in the control group. Successive iterations reassign 
the Congestion Charge intervention to one of the 20 largest cities and move the Congestion 
Charge Zone to the control group. Thus, we proceed sequentially through imagining each city in 
the control group passed the Congestion Charge in 2003 instead of London. We then compute 
the estimated effect associated with each placebo run. This iterative procedure provides a 
distribution of estimated policy effects for the cities where no intervention took place. The CCZ 
reduction of 28 accidents per month takes by far the largest difference-in-difference coefficient 
among the 21 estimated. The next largest coefficient shows a decline less than one-third that size 
and most coefficients from the placebos are essentially zero.  The related ratio of the mean 
squared prediction error after the policy to that before the policy is also by far the largest for the 
CCZ.
10
 Thus, the iterative procedure suggests that if one were to take a placebo test at random, 
there is little chance of finding results the size of that for the CCZ.   
An additional concern may be that identification of the key parameters in Table 1 come 
from a change in policy by a small number of groups (one single local authority) in a relatively 
small number of overall groups. Clustering at the local authority level in this case can cause the 
reported standard errors to be misleadingly small. In response we return to the estimates in Table 
1 and implement the Wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008).  This dramatically 
reduces the high type I error rates common in the presence of clustering on a small number of 
groups. The procedure replicates the within group correlation in errors when generating new 
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Birmingham has the largest mean squared prediction error for the entire study window. Indeed, it is so large (more 
than 3 times larger than the CCZ and 10 times larger in pre-policy period) that it might sensibly be excluded from 
the analysis as there is no combination of other jurisdictions that match its time series (Abadie et al. 2010 p. 502). 
Nonetheless, Birmingham returns an insignificant difference-in-difference coefficient. 
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estimates. Under the null hypothesis of no difference in difference effect, the Wild bootstrap p-
values clustered at a local authority level with 10,000 replications are presented in the Appendix 
Table for the three linear specifications.  All three p-values suggest statistical significance at 
common thresholds when using the preferred Rademacher weights.
11
 Moreover, the supportive 
evidence from the series of placebo tests provides an alternative inference procedure recognized 
as appropriate in the face of a small number of clusters (Cameron and Miller 2015 p. 349). Thus, 
on balance, we believe the CCZ is associated with a large and meaningful decline in the number 
of traffic accidents. 
 
The Spillover Effects of Congestion Charging 
The prior analysis indicates that the congestion charge reduced accidents involving 
treated vehicles within the congestion zone and time. Yet, these estimates may dramatically 
differ from the full influence of the charge.  The estimates may overstate the full influence if 
traffic moves into uncharged times, regions or vehicles.  In the extreme, one might fear that 
accidents are simply displaced and not truly reduced rendering the previous estimates largely 
meaningless. The alternative is that the policy influence identified earlier spillovers over actually 
reducing accidents in adjacent regions and times. This seems at least plausible as the charged 
zone is at the center of a hub and spokes. It thus eliminates vehicle trips that would have come 
into the central district only after crossing many of the adjacent areas.  Moreover, an explicit 
objective of the congestion charge zone policy was to encourage broader use of mass transit and 
this increased use could carry over to times outside the charged hours and areas.
12
 Thus, we test 
for the broader influence of the congestion charge by measuring the substitution effects, the 
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 We recognize that with only a single treatment and control the wild bootstrap may not generate appropriate 
standard errors for the synthetic control estimate. 
12
 Recall that the net revenue from congestion charge is earmarked to improve mass transit. 
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extent to which the charge influences accidents in areas outside the zone, the vehicle type or the 
hours to which it applies.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
 Table 2 estimates variants of model (1) from Table 1 (i.e. difference in difference 
allowing for differential trends) for potential margins of substitution. First, we use GIS to 
identify all accidents outside the CCZ but within 2 kilometers of the CCZ boundary.  We identify 
this as spillover region 1. We then identify all accidents outside the CCZ and outside spillover 
region1 but between 2 kilometers of the CCZ and 4 kilometers from the boundary of the CCZ 
and identify this as spillover region 2. The monthly accidents within each of these spillover 
zones is then used in place of those in the CCZ in a model that otherwise replicates Table 1 by 
comparing them to the accidents in the 20 largest English cities during the congestion charge 
times.  As the first two columns of Table 2 show, there is no evidence of substitution. Not only 
does the number of accidents in these two regions fail to increase as a result of the congestion 
charge, but they significantly decrease. These effects are sizeable suggesting between 10 and 12 
percent less accidents per month in each of these spillover areas. Thus, the response to 
congestion charge appears to be a reduced number of journeys through these areas into central 
London or an increase in the number of people who travel through these areas by mass transit. In 
either case, the reduction in accidents within the CCZ is clearly an underestimate of the full 
number of accident reductions. 
 We next examine what happened to the number of accidents occurring outside of the 
business hours, five days a week, in which the charge is levied. Again, trips that might have 
happened at these peak times (for shopping for example) may simply be postponed till later in 
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the evening or the weekend. This would also cause a displacement in accidents rather than a 
reduction. Column 3 compares the accidents in the CCZ but out of charged hours to the accidents 
in the 20 largest cities out of charged hours. There is no evidence of displacement and, indeed, 
the out of hours accidents in the CCZ actually decline significantly relative to the control. This 
may reflect a general change in behavior and preferences that simply reduced the likelihood of 
driving into the CCZ.  Moreover, the funds raised by the charge improved transit options and 
some of these improvements likely remain for out-of-charge times.  Finally, some of the 
discouraged trips might be one way during the charge time and other way outside the charge time 
and so might otherwise have been partially associated with out-of-charge time accidents. The 
point remains that the congestion charge is associated with fewer accidents not only in the 
charged zone and time but outside the charged zone (but nearby) and outside of the charged time.   
Finally, we examine the accidents in the CCZ and charged hours that involve at least one 
uncharged vehicle.  Again, commuters can substitute away from charged automobiles to these 
taxis, buses, motorcycles and bicycles. Indeed, the traffic flows indicate that the miles in 
uncharged vehicles increases from 91 million miles before the charge to 119 million miles after 
the charge. Thus, one might anticipate an increase in accidents among these vehicles. We 
compare their accidents to those that involve at least one uncharged vehicle during the charged 
hours in the 20 largest cities. The estimates find a marked reduction in accidents involving these 
vehicles of around 12 percent. This may reflect fewer charged automobiles on the road and that 
this decreases the odds of the uncharged vehicles being in an accident even as the miles of 
uncharged vehicles actually increased.  
 We emphasize that while the estimates in Table 2 simply retain the 20 largest cities as the 
control, the results are robust to the matching procedure.  In estimates available from the authors, 
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we created a new synthetic control for each spillover examination (two on area and one each on 
time and vehicle type).  The estimated coefficients on the difference-in-difference are very 
similarly sized to those in Table 2 and indicate in each case a significant reduction in the number 
of accidents in targeted spillover relative to the relevant synthetic control. 
 The critical point is that we have found no evidence of substitution in which uncharged 
adjacent areas, hours or vehicles have increased accidents as a result of the congestion charge.  
Instead, the influence of the congestion charge appears substantially larger than would be 
indicated by limiting the analysis to the zone, time and vehicles directly charged.  Indeed, the 
reduction in accidents in the charged zone, time and vehicles is actually smaller than the sum of 
reductions in other areas, times and vehicles. Thus, there seems to have been a more general and 
fundamental change in the number of trips and/or mode of transportation.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Serious Injuries and Fatalities 
  
While the reduction in accidents is large and widespread, this need not translate into a 
lower incidence of accidents involving severe injury or death. As discussed, the higher road 
speeds associated with the congestion charge may increase the severity of the accidents that do 
occur.  Minor accidents at a slow speed can involve serious injuries or death at a higher speed.  
Moreover, the potential substitution towards vehicles with a greater inherent danger of serious 
injury, such as more accidents involving automobiles and bicycles, also suggests that even 
though there may be fewer accidents there may be more accidents with serious consequences.  In 
addition to this ambiguity, examining accidents that involve hospitalization and death are critical 
for at least two reasons.  First, such accidents likely constitute the bulk of the social costs 
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associated with traffic accidents and so are of strong policy interest. Second, such accidents are 
subject to less measurement error as they are much more likely to be reported and recorded in the 
administrative statistics. 
Table 3 examines the influence of the congestion charge by re-estimating our main model 
for all serious and fatal accidents and then for only fatal accidents. The estimates are limited to 
the CCZ and for accidents involving a charged vehicle in charged times. They are, of course, 
smaller in absolute terms as serious and fatal accidents happen less frequently than do all 
accidents.  Yet, they still remain negative and statistically significant. Moreover, in percentage 
terms these emerge as very large effects (25% and 35%). The estimates indicate that the 
congestion charge reduced the number of serious and fatal accidents in the congestion zone by 
43 a year and reduced the number of fatalities by 4.3 a year. 
The monetary savings associated with the congestion charge and these reductions in 
accidents can be roughly calculated from the estimated value of the direct and indirect costs of 
avoided accidents from the UK Department for Transport (DOT, 2013 p. 39). These estimates 
provide "valuation of both fatal and non-fatal casualties that has been based on a consistent 
willingness to pay (WTP) approach. This approach encompasses all aspects of the valuation of 
casualties, including the human costs, which reflect pain, grief, suffering; the direct economic 
costs of lost output and the medical costs associated with road accident injuries" (UK 
Department for Transport 2013 p.11). The costs are £1,914,229 for an avoided fatal road 
accident, £281,109 for an avoided serious accident and £22,773 for avoiding a neither fatal nor 
serious accident (slight). Our estimates indicate reductions within the CCZ for charged times and 
vehicles of 4.3 fatal accidents, 38.7 serious injury accidents and 427.68 accidents that are neither 
fatal nor serious. These aggregate to £28,849,659 (2012 UK Pounds) in avoided costs per annum. 
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While modest relative to the total of all charges, this benefit does not include the reduction in 
accidents in uncharged times, locations and vehicles, the saved time due to reduced congestion or 
the value of the charges reinvested in the transport system.
13
 
As this point makes clear, the issue of spillovers and substitution can be critical in 
assessing the full influence of the congestion charge.  We reproduce the estimates in the two 
adjacent uncharged regions, for the uncharged hours and for uncharged vehicles within charged 
hours.  In each case the number of serious and fatal accidents falls relative to similarly 
constructed controls. The declines remain large and significant with percentage declines ranging 
from 11 to 23 percent. As in the case of all accidents, failure to recognize the reductions in 
adjacent areas, times and uncharged vehicles would grossly underestimate the true influence of 
the congestion charge on serious and fatal accidents. 
 
5. Empirical Results on Accident Rates 
 The estimates of the previous section confirm a large decline in the accident count in the 
CCZ that is not offset by spillovers into uncharged times, vehicles or adjacent regions.  This is an 
important policy finding as it indicates that lives were saved and costs avoided by the congestion 
charge. Yet, it does not necessarily suggest that reducing congestion ameliorated an accident 
externality. If the flow of traffic fell by 10 percent and the accident count fell by 10 percent, the 
odds of having an accident remain unchanged and there would be no reason to suspect that 
additional drivers both assume the accident risk and increase it for others.  To examine the 
possibility that a congestion externality caused accidents and was ameliorated by the charge we 
now turn to estimating the accident rate. 
                                                 
13
 In addition, alternative estimates of the value of a statistical life in academic studies are often higher than those 
used by the UK Department for Transport.  See for example Bellavance et al. (2009) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003). 
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 The estimation strategy remains broadly similar but the dependent variable is measured 
as the number of accidents in the jurisdiction divided by the number of miles (measured in 
millions) driven in the jurisdiction.  The availability of the traffic flow data forces us to move to 
annual data and raises the issue of how to deal with data from 2003 as the policy began in 
February of that year.  As a conservative approach, we simply drop the year from the analysis 
although if we include it in the treatment period, the results are very similar. The pre-policy 
period saw average annual driving of 582 million miles in the congestion zone and this fell in the 
post-policy period to 500 million miles. At issue is whether or not the number of accidents 
declined sufficiently relative to this drop in miles that, as a consequence, the accident rate in the 
CCZ fell relative to the control. 
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the estimates of the influence of the charge in the 
CCZ against the 20 largest cities. The first estimate mimics our original estimate for the accident 
counts by allowing for differential trends and using area and population as controls. The annual 
data necessarily eliminates the cyclical controls. The point estimate indicates that the congestion 
charge is associated with almost exactly 1 fewer accident per million miles driven. The average 
accident rate in the pre-policy period in the congestion zone is 4.51 accidents per million miles 
suggesting the rate fell approximately 22 percent following the policy.  This percentage decline 
is obviously smaller than that in the accident count but it remains highly significant. Column 2 
reproduces the estimate using the synthetic cohort approach. It returns an estimate that places the 
greatest weight on Liverpool, the sixth largest of the 20 largest cities but with weight also on 
Birmingham, Leicester and Kingston-on-Hull. The estimate is broadly similar indicating 1.2 
fewer accidents per million miles in the CCZ following the policy change.  
 




If miles driven were reduced and accidents simply fell proportionally, there should be a 
coefficient of zero on the difference-in difference in the first two columns of Table 4.  Instead, 
our data show that while the policy caused a substantial reduction in traffic miles, the decline in 
accidents was even larger causing the accident rate to fall.  Thus, the odds of being in an accident 
fell for those continuing to drive into Central London after the policy change. The congestion 
charge improved their safety, an indication that the reduction in congestion caused by the charge 
helped ameliorate a traffic externality. 
The estimates provide a simple way to decompose the reduction in accidents into those 
directly associated with reduced traffic flows holding the accident probability constant and those 
indirectly associated with reduced traffic flows through the reduced accident probability holding 
miles constant. The pre-policy accident rate was 4.51 accidents per million miles and the policy 
was associated with a reduction of 82 million miles driven.  This implies a direct reduction of 
369.8 accidents per year (4.51x82). The number of miles driven after the policy change remained 
500 million miles but the accident rate fell 1.00 per million miles for an indirect reduction of 
500.0 accidents per year. Thus, the reduction in the probability of an accident appears to be more 
important than the simple reduction in miles driven. This comparison helps spotlight the 
importance of the charge in ameliorating the traffic congestion externality.   
It might be argued that the rate reduction could reflect a changing composition of drivers. 
In this view the charge deters the inherently more accident prone from driving rather than 
reducing a congestion externality. Although the exact path of such causation seems unclear, we 
use the measures above to identify the size of the required compositional change. The drivers of 
the 82 million fewer miles driven as a result of the charge would need a large enough accident 
probability that when deterred by the charge they cause the rate to fall by 1.00 accident per 
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million miles. This would require those drivers to have an accident rate of over 10.6 accidents 
per million miles or three times that of the drivers remaining after the charge.
14
  This large 
degree of sorting seems unlikely to us and even whether charge deters the inherently accident 
seems debatable but we admit we have no direct evidence on sorting.
15
  Nonetheless, if the 
policy does deter the most inherently accident prone who are most likely to impose costs on 
others, it may still improve welfare if these costs are not otherwise fully internalized.  
Again, concern about the number of clusters causes us to estimate the clustered standard 
errors using the wild bootstrap.  As shown in the Appendix Table, for both estimates in Table 4 
and for both weighting schemes, the results remain highly statistically significant. 
 The third and fourth columns of Table 4 examine the influence of the congestion charge 
in the adjacent areas. We again examine both a zone 2 kilometers outside the CCZ and from two 
to four kilometers outside the CCZ using the 20 largest cities as controls. In both cases the policy 
generates significant declines in the accident rate. There are .74 fewer accidents per million miles 
in the smaller zone and .75 fewer accidents per million miles in the larger zone.  While smaller 
declines than in the CCZ, they argue that the pattern observed earlier with the number of 
accidents is large enough that the rate declines making travel through these adjacent areas safer 
for those that continue to do so. 
 In Table 5 we examine the rates of accident that result in serious injuries or fatalities.  In 
the first column, we return to the CCZ and limit the rate measure to the number of accidents that 
result in serious injuries or deaths.  Thus, the number of such accidents in each jurisdiction is 
divided by the miles driven in each jurisdiction.  The evidence indicates a decline in the rate of 
                                                 
14
 3.51(500/582) + X(82/582) = 4.51 implies that X = 10.61. 
15
 We note that the charge is not associated with dramatic changes in the age of the drivers actually involved in 
accidents. The young and old are recognized to be at higher risk of traffic fatalities yet the average age of fatalities is 
39.3 both before and after the charge and the standard deviation actually increased.  For accidents overall the 
average age increases from 37.4 to 39.0 but the standard deviation again increased. 
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such accidents by almost .16 of an accident per million miles. This highly significant decline is 
matched by a decline in the rate of fatal accidents alone as shown in the second column.  Here 
the estimate shows a decline of roughly .02 of an accident per million miles.   
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
 In the third and fourth columns of Table 5 we examine the rates of accidents that result in 
serious and fatal injuries in the two adjacent regions. They show a now familiar pattern. The 
estimate for the two kilometer zone is a highly significant decline of .22 accidents per million 
miles.  In the four kilometer zone the estimate is a still significant decline of .14 accidents per 
million miles.  Thus, just as for the accident rates in general, the accident rates for serious and 
fatal accidents decline not only in the CCZ but in adjacent areas as well.  In total, the evidence 
on the rates is consistent across the estimates. The declines we identified in accident counts in 
the previous section are sufficiently large that even given the decline in miles driven, they reduce 
the probability of an accident.
16
 Thus, the congestion charge has made the roads safer for those 
that continue to drive on them. 
 
 
6. Additional Robustness Checks and Policy Variations 
 
A particular concern of policy makers has been the hazard faced by bicycle riders. 
Indeed, Li et al. (2012) suggest that the congestion charge led to an increase in accidents and 
serious injuries by those on bikes. We return to this using our preferred specification and limiting 
our dependent variable to accidents involving bikes. These results are reported in Table 6 where 
we provide estimates for all accidents and for serious and fatal accidents. Critically, we initially 
                                                 
16
 Indeed, the accident and KSI rates for uncharged vehicles within the CCZ also decline significantly and the 
associated estimates are available upon request. 
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show our longer evaluation window rather than the short window ending with 2005 as done in 
the previous study.  Contrary to that previous evidence, we find a reduction in bike accidents that 
fits with the evidence for other types of spillovers.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
In an attempt to reconcile our results with this previous evidence we limit our estimation 
window to successively smaller post-policy periods. Reducing our period to the end of 2006 
substantially reduces the size of the policy effect, and further trimming the period to the end of 
2005 recovers the congestion charge increasing bike accidents, both overall and for serious and 
fatal accidents. Thus, an appropriate summary would be that there existed a short-term increase 
in bike accidents that dissipated and reversed. This fits with new inexperienced bicycle 
commuters initially flooding the congestion zone.  Yet, this eventually became dominated by the 
underlying lower probability of traffic accidents as the riders either gained experience and ability 
as commuters or found alternative modes of transport. 
In Table 7 we return to measuring accident rates. We create a bike accident rate by 
dividing the number of accidents involving bicycles in each jurisdiction by the total miles driven 
by bicycles in the jurisdiction. These rates become the dependent variable with evaluation 
windows of differing lengths. When examining all accidents in the first three columns the 
shortest window yields the smallest reduction in the accident rate but it is still a reduction.  When 
examining the serious and fatal accident rates, the window of 2000 to 2005 window shows no 
improvement in the accident rate. Thus, we find no evidence even in the short term that biking 
became more dangerous. Instead, there was a 66 percent increase in the flow of bike miles in the 
post policy congestion zone and the short term increase in bike accidents largely reflects this 
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flood of new bikers.
17
  The overall rate of accidents declines even in the shortest policy window 
indicating that the zone was safer for bikers and highlighting the importance of examining both 
accident levels and rates. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
The Effect of Later Policy Changes 
 
Our last step is to examine two additional sources of variation in the original congestion charge 
policy intervention. In the first source of variation we recognize that the original congestion 
charge was set at £5 but that this was subsequently increased to £8 in 2005.
18
 We use this, in 
combination with variation in the consumer price index, to generate an annual real congestion 
zone charge in 2003 pounds. In the first column of Table 8 we replace the dummy variable for 
the policy with this real congestion zone charge as a measure of policy intensity. The resulting 
estimate indicates that each real pound in the charge causes a reduction of 5.2 accidents per 
month in the charged area. When examining the accident rate, each pound in charge causes a 




INSERT TABLE 8 
 
 The second major source of variation was a temporary extension of the original 
congestion charge zone to incorporate more western areas (the so-called western extension). This 
extension occurred on February 17, 2007 but charging for the extension was removed on 
December 24, 2010. Mayor Boris Johnson was quoted shortly after the removal saying that the 
                                                 
17
 This compares with only a 2 percent increase in the flow of bike miles in the control jurisdictions. 
18
 Additional charge increases in 2011 and 2014 are outside our evaluation window. 
19
 An alternative test might imagine separate policy variables for the initial CCZ and for the subsequent price 
increase.  While both variables take negative coefficients, this estimate indicates the overwhelming majority of the 
influence is associated with the initial CCZ. 
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removal did not substantially increase congestion and “there has been no significant downside in 
removing the western extension zone (London24).” In part this may reflect that the extension 
always included “free through routes” that were never charged. Also, in part, our previous 
analysis of spatial spillovers suggests that adjacent areas, including the western extension, were, 
in effect, already partially treated. The traffic through this area was reduced by the initial 
congestion zone charge. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
We test the consequences of the Western Extension in two related fashions. For each test 
we extend our original model to incorporate the Western Extension as a separate treated 
jurisdiction (mapped by GIS and matched to traffic accidents). In the first test we include both 
the CCZ and the Western Extension but use a single treatment indicator that turns on for the 
CCZ in February 2003 and on for the Western Extension in February 2007.  In the second test 
we again consider the two treated areas, the CCZ and the Western Extension, but estimate two 
separate difference-in difference estimates. To allow for the complicated dynamics associated 
with the likely spillovers, we include trends for the control (the other English cities), the CCZ 
and the Western Extension for both the pre-treatment and treatment period.  
As shown in the first column of Table 9, the first test suggests that the treatment on the 
two combined regions is associated with a highly significant reduction of 39.6 accidents per 
month.  The second test in column 2 suggests that the implementation of the CCZ is associated 
with a highly significant decline of 42 accidents within the CCZ and that the implementation of 
the Western Extension is associated with a significant but more modest decline of 6.8 accidents 
per period within the Extension.  This pattern carries over to the estimates with rates.  The third 
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column shows that the treatment (differently timed for the two regions) is associated with a 
significant reduction of .79 fewer accidents per one million miles.  The separate estimates in the 
fourth column show two significant influences.  The original CCZ is associated with a reduction 
of .83 accidents per million miles and the extension brought an additional but smaller reduction 
of .50 accidents per million miles.  The critical point from our perspective is that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the implementation of the Western Extension is somehow 
inappropriately generating the fundamental results we have been showing for the CCZ.  The 




 In what has been hailed as a triumph of economics, London has since 2003 charged 
drivers to enter the central congestion zone.  While other cities, including Singapore, Milan and 
Manchester, have either implemented or considered such congestion charges there has not yet 
been a huge movement to mimic London. The advantages of reduced congestion include 
improved travel times and reliability, reduced air pollution from vehicles stuck in traffic and, 
potentially fewer traffic accidents and lost lives.  Theoretically the increased speed may work to 
mitigate reduced congestion by increasing accidents and their severity and substitution away 
from the charged zone, hours and vehicles may also reduce or eliminate any net reduction in 
accidents. 
 We have undertaken a comprehensive examination of the consequences of the London 
congestion charge on vehicle accidents and accident rates.  We find a substantial and significant 
reduction in the number of accidents in the charged zone for charged vehicles and times relative 
to sensible controls. This persists for serious and for fatal accidents.  Critically, there is no 
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evidence that the congestion charge resulted in a permanent increase in accidents for uncharged 
times, adjacent geographic regions or uncharged vehicles. Indeed, we find evidence of reductions 
and these results also persist for serious and for fatal accidents. 
 These findings argue that the congestion charge saved accident costs and lives but, in 
themselves, do not demonstrate that the charge helped solve an externality in which one driver 
imposes expected accident costs on others. This demonstration is provided by our finding that 
accident rates also dramatically declined. The probability of having an accident in Central 
London fell as a result of reducing traffic congestion. Indeed, our back of the envelope 
calculation suggests that this decline in the probability of an accident was more important in 
saving accidents and lives than was the reduction in total miles driven. Thus, by reducing 
congestion, the charge both saved lives by moving people out of automobiles but also by making 
the commute safer for those that continued to drive automobiles. 
 The importance of examining both accident levels and rates reappeared in our bicycle 
estimates.  In a very short window, we confirmed earlier studies by showing that the number of 
bike accidents increased. Yet, this increase reflected only a flood of new bikers and bike miles as 
the accident rate for bikers actually decreased as a result of the congestion charge. Bike riding 
became safer after the policy. 
 We view the sum of our evidence as broadly consistent with the intention of the 
government to use the congestion charge as a mechanism to move travelers out of automobiles 
and into public or alternative transit.  The charge discouraged the use of automobiles and the 
funds raised by the charge were spent on improving public transit, largely bus lines, which saw a 
large increase in bus ridership (Transport for London 2004).  While we have focused on only one 
benefit from the charge, accident reduction, other benefits include increased speed, travel 
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reliability and reduced air pollution.  Obviously, important distributional aspects have also not 
been examined. Customers may have moved away from central city shops and entertainment as 
an example.  Nonetheless, we provide the most comprehensive examination of the influence of 
the charge on traffic accidents and rates and find important reductions in lost money and lives as 




The authors thank Domingo Perez-Ximenez de Embun, Rossella Iraci Capuccinello, Christopher 
Knittel, two reviewers and seminar participants at RWI-Essen, Lancaster University, the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, the 2015 meetings of the Royal Economic Society and of 
the Scottish Economic Society. The authors also acknowledge the Melvin Lurie Memorial Fund 
at UWM which allowed Heywood and Navarro to work together in the fall of 2013 when this 




Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond and Jens Hainmueller. 2010."Synthetic Control Methods for 
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 105: 493-505. 
Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal. 2003. "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study 
of the Basque Country," American Economic Review 93: 113-132. 
Ashenfelter, Orley and Michal Greenstone. 2004. "Using Mandates Speed Limits to Measure the 
Value of a Statistical Life," Journal of Political Economy 112: s226 – s267. 
Bellavance, Francois, Georges Dionne, Martin Lebeauc. 2009. "The Value of a Statistical Life: 
A Meta-analysis with a Mixed Effects Regression Model," Journal of Health Economics 28: 
444 – 64. 
Cameron, A. Colin., Jonah B. Gelbach, Douglas L. Miller. 2008. “Bootstrapped-based 
Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors,” Review of Economics and Statistics 90: 
414–427. 
Cameron, A. Colin., and Douglas L. Miller, 2015. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust 
Inference” Journal of Human Resources, 50: 317–372. 
Department for Transport (2013). Reported Road Casualties Great Britain: Annual Report 2012, 
London. 
Edlin, Aaron S. and Pinar Karaca-Mandic. 2006. “The Accident Externality from Driving,” 
Journal of Political Economy 114: 931 – 955. 
Fosgerau, Morgens and André de Palma. 2013. "The Dynamics of Urban Traffic Congestion and 
the Price of Parking," Journal of Public Economics 105: 106-115. 
Green, Colin P., John S. Heywood and Maria Navarro. (2014). "Did Liberalizing Bar Hours 
33 
 
       Decrease Traffic Accidents?," Journal of Health Economics,  35:189-198. 
Hårsman, Bjorn and John M. Quigley. 2010. "Political and Public Acceptability of Congestion 
Pricing: Ideology and self-interest," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 29: 854-
874. 
Huang, Rachel, Larry Tzeng and Kili Wang. 2013. “Heterogeneity of the Accident Externality 
from Driving,” The Journal of Risk and Insurance 81: 735 – 756. 
Leape, Jonathan. 2006. "The London Congestion Charge," Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 
157 – 76. 
Li, Jaojie, Daniel J. Graham, Arnab Majumdar. 2012. "The Effects of Congestion Charring on 
Road Traffic Casualties: A Causal Analysis Using Difference-in-Difference Estimation," 
Accident Analysis and Prevention 49: 366 – 77. 
London24, “West London Congestion Zone Axe Brings Positive Results,” June 6, 2011, 
http://www.london24.com/news/transport/west_london_congestion_charge_zone_axe_bring
s_positive_results_1_912962 (viewed on June 29, 2014). 
Newberry, David M. 1990. "Pricing and Congestion: Economic Principles Relevant to Pricing 
Roads," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6: 22- 38. 
Parry, Ian WH, and Antonio Bento. 2002. "Estimating the welfare effect of congestion taxes: the 
critical importance of other distortions within the transport system." Journal of Urban 
Economics 51: 339-365. 
Parry, Ian W. H., Margaret Walls and Winston Harrington. 2007. "Automobile Externalities and 
Policies," Journal of Economic Literature 45: 373-399.  
Pigou, A. C. 1924. The Economics of Welfare. Transaction Publishers, New York. 
Quddus, M.A. 2008. "Time Series Count Data Models: An Empirical Application to Traffic 
Accidents," Accident Analysis and Prevention 40: 1732–1741. 
34 
 
Saito, Kuniyoshi, Jato Takaayi and Shimane Tetsuya. 2010. “Traffic Congestion and Accident 
Externality: A Japan-U.S. Comparison,” B.E. Journal of Economics Analysis and Policy 10: 
1 – 31. 
Shefer, D. and Rietveld, P. 1997. "Congestion and Safety on Highways: Towards an Analytical 
Model," Urban Studies 34: 679–92. 
Shepherd, Simon, and Agachai Sumalee. 2004."A Genetic Algorithm Based Approach to 
Optimal Toll Level and Location Problems," Network and Spatial Economics 4: 161–79. 
Sinoski, Kelly. 2015. "No Way around Congestion Tax on New Vehicles for Metro Vancouver 
Residents," Vancouver Sun, March 20: http://www.vancouversun.com/news/around 
+congestion+vehicles/10907285/story.html 
Small, Kenneth A., Clifford Winston, and Jia Yan. 2005. "Uncovering the Distribution of 
Motorists’ Preferences for Travel Time and Reliability," Econometrica 73: 1367–82. 
Transport for London. 2003. Congestion Charging: Six Months On. London, June. 
Transport for London. 2004. Central London Congestion Charging, Impacts Monitoring 
Programme, Second Annual Report London. 
Transport for London. 2005. Central London Congestion Charging Scheme Impacts Monitoring: 
Summary Review. London, January. 
Verhoef, Erik and Jan Rouwendel. 2004. "A Behavioural Model of Traffic Congestion: 
Endogenizing Speed choice, Traffic safety and Time losses," Journal of Urban Economics 
56: 408 – 34. 
Vickrey, William. 1963. "Pricing in Urban and Suburban Transport," American Economic 
Review 52: 452–65. 
35 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip and Joe Aldy. 2003. "The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of 
Market Estimates Throughout the World," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27: 5 – 76. 
Walters, Alan A. 1961. “The Theory and Measurement of Private and Social Cost of Highway 
Congestion.” Econometrica. 29: 676–99. 
Wang, Chao, Quddus, Mohammed A. and Ison, Stephen G. 2009. "Impact of Traffic Congestion 
on Road Accidents: A Spatial analysis of the M25 Motorway in England," Accident Analysis 










































Figure 3: Spline Regression for Number of Accidents: Charged vehicles, charged hours in CCZ 
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TABLE 1: Effect of Congestion Charges on Monthly Accidents for Charged Vehicles in Charged Times 
in the CCZ vs Charged Vehicles and Times in the 20 Largest British Cities, 2000-2009  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS Poisson Neg. Bin OLS Synthetic 
Control 
      
Mean traffic accs 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
   111.027 
      
CCZ*Policy  -39.240 -0.389 -0.443 -40.847 -28.311 
 (1.153)*** (0.017)*** (0.024)*** (1.193)*** (5.451)*** 
  [0.322] [0.358]   
Policy 3.727 0.073 0.079 3.804 0.840 
 (1.011)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (1.013)*** (3.279) 
CCZ -147.745 -1.413 -1.554 -168.642 21.321 
 (14.452)*** (0.143)*** (0.275)*** (14.590)*** (27.825) 
Month Trend -0.331 -0.005 -0.005 -0.331 -0.382 
 (0.046)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.047)*** (0.039)*** 
Month Trend * CCZ -0.431 -0.005 -0.004 -0.418 0.143 
 (0.041)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.044)*** (0.083)* 
Area -395.651 0.140 -1.054 -396.064 0.000 
 (186.575)** (2.607) (3.419) (186.943)** (0.000) 
Population 184.589 1.905 2.055 184.632 -23.153 
 (11.698)*** (0.124)*** (0.248)*** (11.712)*** (27.730) 
Month dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month 
dummies*CCZ 
   Yes  
      
Observations 2520 2520 2520 2520 240 
R-squared 0.83   0.84 0.80 
Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. The terms in square brackets,   
[ ], are the computed percentage declines for the respective estimates. All estimates include a constant. 






















TABLE 2: Spillover Effects of the Congestion Charge on Accidents vs. 20 Largest British Cities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Mean traffic accs 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
118.054 155.351 85.865 127.324 
     
CCZ*Policy -14.379 -15.983 -12.151 -14.018 
 (0.954)*** (0.954)*** (0.786)*** (0.623)*** 
 [0.129] [0.126] [0.291] [0.117] 
Policy 2.663 2.681 -0.210 1.005 
 (0.942)** (0.941)*** (0.786) (0.632) 
CCZ 45.645 84.535 29.857 113.882 
 (9.705)*** (9.705)*** (7.905)*** (2.404)*** 
Month Trend -0.285 -0.285 -0.167 -0.075 
 (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.028)*** (0.011)*** 










     
Month dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2520 2520 2520 2520 
R-squared 0.11 0.19 0.07 0.70 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. The estimates inside the square 
brackets, [  ], are the percentage declines computed from the otherwise identical Negative Binomial. All 















TABLE 3: Serious and Fatal Injuries and Congestion Charging 
Spillovers in Serious and Fatal Accidents 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 









       
Mean traffic accs 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
14.459 1.040 15.973 20.973 12.757 17.243 
       
CCZ*Policy -3.600 -0.359 -3.735 -2.265 -1.986 -2.049 
 (0.241)*** (0.073)*** (0.241)*** (0.241)*** (0.319)*** (0.142)*** 
 [0.235] [0.567] [0.220] [0.084] [0.235] [0.109] 
Policy -0.153 -0.073 -0.150 -0.158 -0.189 0.082 
 (0.238) (0.060) (0.238) (0.238) (0.320) (0.146) 
CCZ 7.349 0.294 8.723 14.448 4.632 15.190 
 (1.014)*** (0.057)*** (1.014)*** (1.014)*** (1.178)*** (0.343)*** 
Month Trend -0.021 -0.000 -0.021 -0.021 -0.025 -0.008 
 (0.004)*** (0.001) (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** 














       
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 2515 1407 2515 2515 2515 2434 
R-squared 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.23 0.06 0.51 
 Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. The estimates inside the 
square brackets, [  ], are the percentage declines computed from the otherwise identical Negative 
Binomial. All estimates include a constant. ***,**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 





















Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. All estimates include a 








 (1) (2)  
Synthetic Control 
Spillovers 
Region1      Region2 
     
Mean accs rates 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
4.512 4.512 4.522 4.623 
     
CCZ*Policy -1.001 -1.203 -0.738 -0.745 
 (0.063)*** (0.245)*** (0.058)*** (0.058)*** 
Policy -0.060 0.153 -0.069 -0.069 
 (0.058) (0.164) (0.058) (0.058) 
CCZ 0.070 -1.453 1.775 1.924 
 (0.787) (0.586)** (0.249)*** (0.249)*** 
Year Trend -0.097 -0.312 -0.093 -0.093 
 (0.017)*** (0.025)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
Year Trend * CCZ 0.022 0.261 0.054 0.030 
 (0.027) (0.048)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)* 
Area -40.725 0.000   
 (14.698)** (0.000)   
Population 1.582 0.910   
 (0.760)* (0.623)   
     
Observations 189 18 189 189 
R-squared 0.43 0.98 0.25 0.26 
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Table 5: Congestion Charge, Spatial Spillovers and Accident Rates  
 KSI Fatalities Spillovers KSI 
   Region 1 Region 2 
     
Mean accs rates 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
0.622 0.026 0.672 0.711 
     
CCZ*Policy -0.158 -0.021 -0.217 -0.136 
 (0.011)*** (0.002)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
Policy -0.025 0.004 -0.025 -0.025 
 (0.011)** (0.002)* (0.011)** (0.011)** 
CCZ 0.284 -0.001 0.327 0.416 
 (0.030)*** (0.002) (0.030)*** (0.030)*** 
Year Trend -0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Year Trend * CCZ 0.016 0.003 0.020 -0.006 
 (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
     
Observations 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.28 0.13 0.31 0.32 
Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. All estimates include a 






Table 6: Congestion Charge and Bike Accident Counts 
 All Accidents Serious and Fatal Accidents 
 2000-2009 2000-2006 2000-2005 2000-2009 2000-2006 2000-2005 
       
Mean traffic accs 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
31.703 31.703 31.703 3.946 3.946 3.946 
       
CCZ*Policy -2.853 -1.435 1.538 -0.604 0.207 0.993 
 (0.263)*** (0.300)*** (0.295)*** (0.083)*** (0.107)* (0.095)*** 
Policy -0.688 -0.356 -0.057 0.058 -0.106 -0.002 
 (0.253)** (0.279) (0.286) (0.085) (0.112) (0.102) 
CCZ 24.712 25.488 27.530 2.626 3.079 3.650 
 (0.722)*** (0.719)*** (0.744)*** (0.077)*** (0.079)*** (0.087)*** 
Month Trend 0.003 -0.005 -0.016 0.002 0.006 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)** (0.001) (0.003)** (0.003) 
Month Trend * CCZ 0.017 -0.024 -0.131 0.012 -0.012 -0.042 
 (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Month dummies Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2513 1757 1505 1775 1208 1044 
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.33 0.30 0.31 
Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. All estimates include a 
















Table 7: Congestion Charge and Bike Accident Rates 
 All Accidents Serious and Fatal Accidents 
 2000-2009 2000-2006 2000-2005 2000-2009 2000-2006 2000-2005 
       
Mean accs rates 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
22.723 22.723 22.723 2.908 2.908 2.908 
       
CCZ*Policy -18.173 -20.404 -11.665 -2.010 -1.826 -0.058 
 (3.013)*** (3.405)*** (2.939)*** (0.793)** (1.020)* (0.935) 
Policy 8.731 15.214 8.366 0.768 1.659 0.611 
 (3.013)*** (3.405)*** (2.939)*** (0.793) (1.020) (0.935) 
CCZ -32.197 -34.240 -27.686 -3.941 -3.914 -2.588 
 (2.860)*** (3.452)*** (2.649)*** (0.663)*** (0.788)*** (0.775)*** 
Month Trend -1.762 -4.000 -1.432 0.011 -0.297 0.096 
 (0.465)*** (0.876)*** (0.890) (0.124) (0.235) (0.228) 
Month Trend * CCZ 1.888 2.909 -0.368 0.064 0.050 -0.613 
 (0.465)*** (0.876)*** (0.890) (0.124) (0.235) (0.228)** 
       
Observations 189 126 105 189 126 105 
R-squared 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. ***,**, * indicate statistical 




Table 8: Prices, Congestion Charges and Traffic Accidents 
 Accidents Accident rates 
   
Mean dependent variable 
CCZ (pre-policy) 
111.027 4.512 
   
CCZ*Price (£) -5.227 -0.001 
 (0.177)*** (0.000)*** 
Price (£) 0.482 -0.000 
 (0.177)** (0.000) 
CCZ 32.923 1.803 
 (9.686)*** (0.250)*** 
   
Observations 2520 189 
R-squared 0.10 0.24 
All models include time trends, time trend interacted with CCZ and monthly dummies in column 1. Robust 
standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. ***,**, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 9: The Impact of the Western Extension on Traffic Accidents  
 Traffic accidents Accident rates 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) 
     
Mean CCZ (pre-policy 03) 111.027 111.027 4.456 4.456 
Mean WE (pre-policy 07) 40.106 40.106 2.597 2.597 
     
     
Treatment*Policy -39.601***  -0.793***  
 (4.230) 
[0.357] 
 (0.117)  
CCZ*Policy 2003  -42.265***  -0.832*** 
  (1.984) 
[0.364] 
 (0.097) 
Western Extension*Policy 2007  -6.831*  -0.497** 
  (3.548) 
[0.252] 
 (0.188) 
Policy 2003 2.012 2.133 -0.124 -0.122 
 (2.744) (2.709) (0.156) (0.156) 
Policy 2007 4.653 3.163 0.061 0.047 
 (4.414) (4.232) (0.246) (0.250) 
CCZ 43.782*** 44.972*** 1.559*** 1.576*** 
 (9.254) (9.042) (0.270) (0.269) 
Western Extension -30.184*** -30.679*** 0.426 0.421 
 (9.483) (9.505) (0.260) (0.261) 
Month Trend -0.190*** -0.188*** -0.125*** -0.124*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.037) (0.037) 
Month Trend * CCZ -0.419*** -0.468*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 
 (0.094) (0.060) (0.040) (0.037) 










Month Dummies Yes Yes   
     
Observations 2640 2640 198 198 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.242 0.242 
Robust standard errors clustered at a local authority level in parentheses. The estimates inside the square 
brackets, [  ], are the percentage declines computed from the otherwise identical Negative Binomial. All 
estimates include a constant.***,**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Treatment*Policy is a dummy variable which takes value 1 for the initial CCZ from the 17
th
 
of February 2003 and for the Western Extension from the 19
th
 of February 2007 onwards and 0 
otherwise. CCZ corresponds to the initial congestion charge zone and Western Extension corresponds to 
the extended area. Policy 2003 takes value 1 from the 17
th
 of February 2003 and 0 otherwise. Policy 2007 











Table A.1. Alternative Approaches to Cluster Inference, Accident Levels and Rates.  
 Accidents Accident rates 
 Table1 









      
Clustering 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 0.0001 0.0060 
      
Wild cluster bootstrap      
Rademacher weights 0.0164 0.0364 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Mammen weights 0.5486 0.5388 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Note: p-values for the preferred specifications, Synthetic control approach (with population and area). 
The first row shows p-values based on standard errors clustered at a local authority level (city level). The 
second and third rows show p-values based on wild cluster bootstrap procedures (10,000 replications 
estimated under the null hypothesis of no Congestion Charge effect on accidents) using the Rademacher 
and Mammen weights, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
